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      PRECEDENTIAL  
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
     
 
Nos. 12-3617, 12-3996 and 13-1455 
     
 
 
In re:  MICHAEL J. PENDLETON, 
 
                                  Petitioner in Case No. 12-3617 
 
 
 
In re:  FRANKLIN X. BAINES,  
 
                                     Petitioner in Case No. 12-3996 
 
 
 
In re:  COREY GRANT, 
 
                                 Petitioner in Case No. 13-1455 
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On Applications for Leave to File a Second or Successive 
Habeas Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b) 
No. 12-3617 related to W.D. Pa. No. 12-cv-00195  
before the Honorable Kim R. Gibson, District Judge and  
Honorable Keith A. Pesto, Magistrate Judge 
No. 12-3996 related to E.D. Pa. No. 12-cv-05672  
before the Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig 
No. 13-1455 related to D. N.J. No. 06-cv-05952  
before Honorable Harold A. Ackerman 
        
 
Argued on September 10, 2013 
  
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: October 3, 2013) 
 
 
Lisa B. Freeland, Esquire  (Argued) 
Federal Public Defender  
Western District of Pennsylvania 
Office of Federal Public Defender 
1001 Liberty Avenue 
1500 Liberty Center 
Pittsburgh, PA   15222 
 
  Counsel for Petitioner Michael J. Pendleton 
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Stephen A. Zappala, Jr., Esquire 
District Attorney 
Michael W. Streily, Esquire 
Deputy District Attorney 
Rusheen R. Pettit, Esquire  (Argued) 
Assistant District Attorney 
Allegheny County Office of the District Attorney 
436 Grant Street 
303 Courthouse 
Pittsburgh, PA   15219 
 
Counsel for Respondent Gerald Rozum, 
Superintendent at SCI Somerset 
 
 
David R. Fine, Esquire  (Argued) 
George A. Bibikos, Esquire 
K&L Gates, LLP 
Market Square Plaza 
17 North Second Street, 18
th
 Floor 
Harrisburg, PA   17101 
 
  Counsel for Petitioner Franklin X. Baines 
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R. Seth Williams, Esquire 
District Attorney  
Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Esquire 
Chief, Appeals Unit 
Thomas W. Dolgenos, Esquire 
Chief, Federal Litigation  
Ronald Eisenberg, Esquire  (Argued) 
Deputy District Attorney 
Edward F. McCann, Jr., Esquire 
First Assistant District Attorney 
Philadelphia County Office of District Attorney 
3 South Penn Square 
Philadelphia, PA   19107 
 
Counsel for Respondents Louis S. Folino, 
Superintendent, SCI, Green; The Attorney 
General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
 
 
Marc Bookman, Esq. 
Atlantic Center for Capital Representation 
1315 Walnut Street – Ste. 1331 
Philadelphia, PA   19107 
 
Counsel for the Atlantic Center for Capital 
Representation, Amicus Petitioner 
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Bradley S. Bridge, Esq. 
Defender Association of Philadelphia 
1441 Sansom Street 
Philadelphia, PA   19102 
 
Counsel for the Defender Association of 
Philadelphia, Amicus Petitioner 
 
 
Marsha L. Levick, Esq. 
Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia 
1315 Walnut Street – Ste. 400 
Philadelphia, PA   19107 
 
Counsel for the Juvenile Law Center of 
Philadelphia,  Amicus Petitioner 
 
 
David B. Glazer, Esquire  (Argued) 
Glazer & Luciano 
19-21 West Mount Pleasant Avenue 
Livingston, NJ   07039 
 
  Counsel for Petitioner Corey Grant 
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Paul J. Fishman, Esquire 
United States Attorney  
Mark E. Coyne, Esquire  
Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Appeals Division 
Steven G. Sanders, Esquire  (Argued) 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Office of United States Attorney 
970 Broad Street – Rm. 700 
Newark, NJ   07102 
 
Counsel for Respondent United States of 
America 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2010), 
the Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole 
for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes 
violates the Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition on „cruel and 
unusual punishments.‟”  Corey Grant, Franklin X. Baines, 
and Michael J. Pendleton (collectively, “Petitioners”), each of 
whom claims to be serving a mandatory sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole for offenses committed as 
juveniles, seek our authorization to file successive habeas 
corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (for Baines and 
Pendleton) and 2255 (for Grant) to raise Miller claims.  Both 
Baines and Pendleton were convicted in state court in 
Pennsylvania, and Grant was convicted in federal court in 
New Jersey.  Because these petitions raise similar legal 
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questions, we consolidated them for argument and now 
address them jointly. 
 Before a second or successive petition may be filed in 
district court, the petitioner must apply for a certification 
from the appropriate United States court of appeals.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).  A certification giving leave to file a 
successive petition will be granted when the petitioner has 
made a “prima facie” showing that his or her claim relies on 
“a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable.” Id. § 2244 (b)(2)(A) & (3)(A)(C); see also § 
2255(h)(2).  Under our precedent, a “prima facie showing” in 
this context merely means “„a sufficient showing of possible 
merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.‟” 
Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 220 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 
 The parties here agree that Miller states a new rule of 
constitutional law, but dispute whether the Supreme Court has 
made Miller retroactive to cases on collateral review.  In 
Pendleton‟s and Baines‟s cases, Pennsylvania argues that 
Miller is not retroactive; in Grant‟s case, the United States 
asserts that Miller is retroactive but that Grant‟s sentence 
satisfies the new Miller rule and so no relief is warranted.
1
  
                                              
1
 At this early stage, we will not consider whether Grant 
actually qualifies for relief under Miller.  We only determine 
whether Grant has made a prima facie showing that Miller 
created “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 
previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2).  See 
Goldblum, 510 F.3d at 219 (“„[S]ufficient showing of 
possible merit‟ in this context does not refer to the merits of 
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Petitioners argue: (1) that the Supreme Court implicitly made 
Miller retroactive by applying the rule to Miller‟s companion 
case, Jackson v. Hobbs, which came to the Court through 
Arkansas‟s  state collateral review process; (2) that Miller 
announced a substantive rule that “necessarily carr[ies] a 
significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment that 
the law cannot impose upon him,” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 
U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (internal quotations marks omitted), and 
therefore should be given retroactive effect under Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality); and (3) that, in the 
alternative, Miller qualifies as a “watershed procedural rule[] 
of criminal procedure” meriting retroactive application under 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.  
 
 After extensive briefing and oral argument, we 
conclude that Petitioners have made a prima facie showing 
that Miller is retroactive. In doing so, we join several of our 
sister courts of appeals. See, e.g., Wang v. United States, No. 
13-2426 (2d Cir. July 16, 2013) (granting motion to file a 
successive habeas corpus petition raising a Miller claim); In 
re James, No. 12-287 (4th Cir. May 10, 2013) (same); 
Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam) (same).  But see In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 (11th 
Cir. 2013) (concluding that Miller is not retroactive), reh’g en 
banc denied, 717 F.3d 1186; Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, 
2013 WL 69128 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (per curiam) (same).  
 
 However, we stress that our grant is tentative, and the 
District Court must dismiss the habeas corpus petition for 
                                                                                                     
the claims asserted in the petition. Rather, it refers to the 
merits of a petitioner‟s showing with respect to the 
substantive requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).”). 
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lack of jurisdiction if it finds that the requirements for filing 
such a petition have not in fact been met. Goldblum, 510 F.3d 
at 219-20; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4) (“A district court 
shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive 
application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed 
unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the 
requirements of this section.”).  We therefore grant 
Petitioners‟ motions under §§ 2244(b)(3) and 2255(h) and 
authorize each to file a successive habeas corpus petition in 
the district court. 
